

THE ROLE OF THE ECOWAS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED  
KINGDOM IN TERMINATING SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

A Thesis presented  
by  
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## ABSTRACT

# THE ROLE OF THE ECOWAS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM IN TERMINATING SIERRA LEONE CIVIL WAR

June 2015

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This study investigates the influences of military and diplomatic interventions of the United Nations (UN), the United Kingdom (UK), and the Economic Communities of West African States (ECOWAS), which may have influenced the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in accepting and implementing the ‘second Abuja cease-fire agreement’ in May 2001, which ended the decade-long armed conflict in Sierra Leone. I used ‘Process Tracing’ (PT), a method used to explore the causal mechanism between the interventions and the RUF’s compliance to the second Abuja ceasefire agreement. First, I examined military and diplomatic interventions of the UN, the UK, and of the ECOWAS. For this I used secondary data, such as documents from the UN, the UK, the ECOWAS, and other studies regarding interventions in Sierra Leone. Then I explored if their interventions have had an influence on RUF’s willingness to accept the cease-fire and to lay down arms.

To understand this causal mechanism, I used the testimonies of internal players such as the RUF, a pro-government force, as well as the testimonies and statements of external players such as the UN, the UK, and the ECOWAS. I found that the UN, the UK, and the ECOWAS have gradually intensified their military and diplomatic interventions from the beginning of the war in 1991 to the end in 2002. A sudden shock to RUF's relative military and leadership capacities were the two main reasons the RUF finally chose not to fight and instead to lay down their arms. Assumed benefits out of a power sharing agreement, as well as efforts to achieve peace, were contributing factors that RUF considered before they opted to not continue fighting. However, the results do not strongly support the causal mechanism that the shock to the relative military and leadership capacities was the consequence of the military and diplomatic interventions of the UN, the UK, and of the ECOWAS.

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I would like to thank my wife and my parents. Of course, thanks are not enough for them because they made me who I am today. They have sacrificed every single pleasure of their life, helped make my dreams come true as if my dreams were their own, and restlessly pushed me to achieve them. I do not exist without them. I would also like to thank my aunty, Nasim Jahan, who has supported me in every possible manner and has provided me with love and affection in my parents’ absence.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AFRC-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council  
RUF-Revolutionary United Front  
UN-United Nations  
UNSC-United Nations Security Council  
ECOWAS-Economic Community of West African States  
ECOMOG-Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
UK-United Kingdom  
SLA-Sierra Leone Army  
UNSG-United Nations Secretary General  
CDF-Civil Defense Force  
UNAMSIL-United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone  
UNOMSIL-United Nations Observer Missions in Sierra Leone  
DDR-Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration  
MI-Military Integration  
UCDP-The Uppsala Conflict Data Program  
PRIO-Peace Research Institute Oslo  
SLPP-Sierra Leone People's Party  
TRC-Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
PT-Process Tracing  
CPO-Causal Process Observation  
NPFL-National Patriotic Front of Liberia  
IMATT-International Military Advisory Training Team

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, “the trend of conflict has significantly transformed from interstate to intrastate i.e. civil war, ethnic violence, identity and communal conflicts,” (Mason, Gurses, Brandt & Quinn, 2011). Studies suggest that these intrastate conflicts are very often difficult to contain, and many of them reoccurred within years of negotiated settlement (Mason et. al. 2011; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Based on the Correlates of War Documents, Mason et al. (2011) claims that, in between 1944 and 1997, 104 civil wars have occurred in 54 nations and 26 of the 54 nations experienced more than one civil war. Additionally, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) list 124 civil wars from 69 nations, of which only 36 nations having experienced one, and only one, conflict. However, the duration of civil war is usually longer than the interstate war, the median duration being seven years (Fearon and Laitin, 2008). Furthermore, Coleman (2003) noted that about 40% of current intrastate conflicts have persisted for 10 years or more with 25% of the conflict being waged and lasting for more than 25 years.

This pervasive and protracted nature of intrastate conflict raised questions as to what conditions end or protract civil wars, why warring parties enter into negotiated settlements but restart violence, and do international or regional interventions have anything to do with parties' willingness to continue or terminate war. If this is the case, then what is the nature of those interventions? This study is an attempt to investigate the influences of external interventions that might motivate parties to terminate a civil war.

This research critically analyzes the influences of the diplomatic and military interventions of the UN, the UK and the ECOWAS<sup>1</sup>, on the RUF in accepting and implementing the second Abuja cease-fire agreement in May 2001, which led to the termination of the Sierra Leone 'civil war/armed conflict'<sup>2</sup> in early 2002.

This study examines specifically two research questions. 1) What were the situations in which the RUF agreed on and implemented the Abuja II ceasefire agreement while two comprehensive, previously signed agreements failed the compliance?

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<sup>1</sup> Economic Communities of West African States is a regional organization of fifteen West African states. It was founded in 1975 with the signing of the Treaty of Lagos.

<sup>2</sup> I will use armed conflict and civil war interchangeably throughout the paper because they indicate the same phenomenon. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) define 'a civil war as an armed conflict that produces at least 1000 battle related deaths, occur within internationally recognized boundary of a state, and state was one of the principal combatants.' On the other hand, UCDP/PRIO defines an armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed forces between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths in one calendar year," (retrieved from: [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Warring\\_party\\_2](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/#Warring_party_2)).

2) In pursuit of the compliance to the cease-fire, what role was played by the ‘external actors’<sup>3</sup> with special attention to their diplomatic and military interventions?

### **Rationale for the Study:**

The civil war in Sierra Leone started in March 1991 when a rebel movement, RUF, launched a “two-pronged” attack from the country’s eastern part bordering Liberia, and the war prolonged for almost eleven years before it was officially declared over in February 2002, (Richards, 2003; Ducasse-Rogier, 2004). A number of peace agreements were signed during this time to terminate the conflict. The United Nations Peacemaker<sup>4</sup> recorded six peace agreements of which two were “comprehensive peace agreements (CPA)”<sup>5</sup> signed during this time to terminate the war. Of the agreements, Ducasse-Rogier (2004) claims that the Second Abuja Cease-Fire Agreement of May 2001 lead to the termination of the eleven-year civil war.

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<sup>3</sup> I investigated the diplomatic and military interventions of the United Nations as an international organization, ECOWAS as a regional organization, and the United Kingdom as a big state. However, for this study, I term these three bodies as ‘external actors’.

<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Peacemaker’s ‘peace agreement database’ is a collection of over 750 documents of peace agreements with full text. The full text of the six peace agreements on Sierra Leone can be accessed at [http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field\\_padate\\_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field\\_pacountry\\_tid=sierra+leone&=Search+Peace+Agreements](http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=sierra+leone&=Search+Peace+Agreements).

<sup>5</sup> The Peace Accord Matrix defines a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) “if the major parties in the conflict are involved in the negotiation processes and substantive issues underlying the dispute are included in the negotiation process. A CPA is not defined based on implementation of impact of the agreement,” (VanderZee, Taylor, Dukalskis, Gottlieb-McHale and Sullivan, 2010).

The first comprehensive Abidjan Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on November 30, 1996 in Abidjan, the former capital and now economic city of Cote d'Ivoire. The Peace Accord Matrix mentioned that “the first treaty fell apart as the parties failed to maintain cease-fire and resumed fighting each other. In addition, a coup staged on 26 May 1997 by a fraction of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) permanently derailed the agreement.<sup>6</sup> President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah ousted by the coup fled to Guinea and the RUF joined hands with the military junta Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)”, (Richards, 2003).

Following the breakdown of the Abidjan Peace Agreement and the resulting coup, the leaders of West African states stepped in with their diplomatic and military tools to re-establish democratic processes in Sierra Leone through reinstating the legitimate Kabbah Government. “A six months Conakry Peace Plan signed between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the delegation representing Johnny Paul Koroma of AFRC. As several deadlines to implement the peace plan failed, the ECOWAS intervened militarily by sending its Nigerian contingent of Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)<sup>7</sup> to overthrow the military

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<sup>6</sup> The Peace Accord Matrix recorded the implementation status of each of the terms of the two comprehensive agreements (the Abidjan and Lome agreements). In the case of the Abidjan agreement, none of the terms were implemented because parties never followed the cease-fire clause in the first place, (Peace Accords Matrix, Date of retrieval: 11/22/2013, retrieved from: <[https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/14/cease\\_fire](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/14/cease_fire)>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame).

<sup>7</sup> The ECOWAS established ECOMOG in 1990 in the wake of civil war in Liberia. The primary purpose is to establish peace and regional stability. An armed monitoring group, ECOMOG is made up of soldiers

government, and in February 1998, it reinstated the Kabbah Government,” (Richards, 2003).

The second comprehensive agreement, the Lome Peace Agreement, was signed between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF on 7 July 1999 at Lome, the capital of Togo. According to the agreement, “all parties should have ceased all hostilities with immediate effect,” (Lome Agreement, part one; article:1). But neither the Sierra Leone Government nor the RUF complied with the provisions. The non-compliance to the treaty has been reported. For example, Ambassador Francis Okelo, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), reported “cease-fire violations as active combat, movements of troops and weaponry, human abuses against civilians, systematic assault on humanitarian personnel and continued detention of abductees particularly of women and children by all parties.”<sup>8</sup>

Finally, during a one-day conference on 10 November 2000, at the Nigerian administrative capital, Abuja, “government and rebel peace negotiators agreed to a 30-day unconditional cease-fire agreement. The ceasefire went into effect at midnight. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Lome Peace Agreement as the basis for restoration of genuine and lasting peace to the country,” (Abuja Cease-fire Agreement).

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from member states with biggest contribution from Nigeria, (BBC News, Thursday, 17 June 2004; available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country\\_profiles/2364029.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/2364029.stm)).

<sup>8</sup> Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: 11/22/2013), <[https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease\\_fire](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease_fire)>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

The cease-fire lasted for more than 30 days. However, the final cessation of hostilities came on May 2001 “when the rebels and the pro-government forces agreed for a truce during peace talks aimed at ending decades’ old civil war,” (Peace Accord Matrix)<sup>9</sup>. This agreement is well-known as the ‘Second Abuja Cease-fire Agreement,’ (Duscasse-Rogier, 2004). A communiqué issued by the Civil Defense Force (CDF), a government backed force, and RUF said that “to ensure cessation of all hostilities and to that effect hereby instruct all our combatants to desist from any hostile activity. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) will immediately ensure the observance of this undertaking as well as the unimpeded movement of persons, goods, and services throughout the country”.<sup>10</sup>

As Duscasse-Rogier (2004) noted, none but the Second Abuja Cease-Fire Agreement of May 2001 became instrumental in terminating the war. Following this agreement, “no incidence of fighting recorded in Sierra Leone,”<sup>11</sup> which is why the Agreement carries enormous significance particularly as to why such an agreement was instrumental in ending a protracted conflict.

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<sup>9</sup> Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: 11/22/2013), <[https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease\\_fire](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease_fire)>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

<sup>10</sup> The communiqué was signed by Chief Hinga Norman for Civil Defense Force, Omrey Golley for RUF and witnessed by Oluyemi Adeniji. The communiqué can be retrieved from the United Nations Peacemaker’s Peace Agreement database at [http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field\\_padate\\_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field\\_pacountry\\_tid=sierra+leone&=Search+Peace+Agreements](http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=&field_pacountry_tid=sierra+leone&=Search+Peace+Agreements).

<sup>11</sup> Peace Accords Matrix (Date of retrieval: 11/22/2013), <[https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease\\_fire](https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/matrix/status/15/cease_fire)>, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame.

Richards (2003) argues that “Abuja I and Abuja II ceasefire agreements resulted from the pressure on Liberian supply lines to the RUF and through confidence building measures on the ground among the combatants.” Richard’s explanations point us to the diplomatic and military interventions carried out by the ECOWAS, the UN, and the UK from 1991 until the end of the conflict.

The ECOWAS played a political and diplomatic role in order to negotiate peace deals between the warring parties as well as having intervened militarily by sending ECOMOG troops. The UN and the British were other influential outside parties actively involved in the conflict. The UN involvement in the conflict was limited to an observing mission until October 1999. As two peace deals broke down, the UN changed its mandate from chapter VI to chapter VII and deployed troops by 2001. The UN deployment reached 17,500 troops. The UN also imposed several embargoes on RUF and its sponsor Liberia “because RUF had strong connections with Charles Taylor, also a rebel leader and later became Liberia’s president in 1995. RUF used to get military supports from Charles Taylor in exchange for diamonds,” (Richards, 2003; Dupuy & Binningsbo, 2007). Later, Taylor was accused of aiding and abetting RUF rebels by a UN backed war crimes court, and in 2012 he was sentenced to 50 years of imprisonment, (BBC News, Africa, 30 May, 2012).

Finally, the British intervened in May 2000 and sent troops and the navy ‘primarily to evacuate foreign citizens from the country. Later, the mission under code name ‘Operation Palliser’ expanded and worked jointly with UN and ECOWAS troops. The British mission also trained the Sierra Leone Army,’ (Woods & Resse, 2008; Evove, 2008).

Therefore, this study explores if the military and diplomatic interventions of the external actors have been influential in convincing RUF to comply with, and stick to, the Second Abuja Cease-fire Agreement of May 2001. Have the external interventions changed any particular situation for the RUF where they had to comply with cessation of hostilities?

The signing of the second Abuja Ceasefire Agreement is the basic point of investigation for this study. Because, following the agreement all parties have ceased hostilities and according to the battle related death data set of UCDP/PRIO, there was no battle related death recorded after this date until today.<sup>12</sup>

What follows in the coming chapters, particularly in chapter two, I discuss the literature on civil war termination organized thematically. Chapter three deals with the discussion of methodology, the causal mechanism, the data collection process, and mode

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<sup>12</sup> As noted earlier, the UCDP/PRIO defines an armed conflict if it produces at least 25 battle related deaths a year. On that basis, it recorded battle related deaths in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2000 as follows: 200, 600, 600, 600, 1000, 274, 413, 2063, 8250 and 212. However, there is no battle related deaths recorded since 2002 showing termination of this armed conflict.

of analysis for the study. In chapter four, I discuss the analysis of the data in two sections. The first section includes the analysis of the diplomatic and military interventions, and the second section includes the analysis of data showing the impacts of the intervention. The concluding chapter discusses the results, as well as the limitations, for this study.

## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

I divided the literature on civil war into three main themes. First, studies that include contents of agreements such as what terms should be included and should not be included, and their impacts; who should be involved and who should not be and so forth. Second, literature on third party interventions including, international or regional organizations, or a combination of all; types of interventions such as diplomatic, military, humanitarian, economic, or humanitarian; structure of interventions (i.e. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or observer mission). Finally, literature on internal factors of war location that may include social, political, economic, demographic, religious, or geographic factors.

#### **Contents of Agreements and its Processes:**

In the process of a civil war termination, some of the important issues are the security of the former combatants after the war is over, incorporation of power sharing provisions, the role of civil society groups in the processes of agreements, specific deadlines for implementation, or provisions for third party enforcement etc.

Former combatants' security concerns are considered one of the important barriers in the process of terminating a civil war because they may discourage the warring parties, if not addressed in agreements, to enter into a negotiated settlement or they may resume fighting even after a settlement is reached if they feel their security is at stake. Therefore, Glassmyer and Sambanis (2008) argue for addressing the security issues by integrating the former combatants into the military because they argue that, "signing and implementing a 'Military Integration' (MI) agreement provides security guarantees for the former rebels in one hand and it also acts as an economic strategy on the other that may discourage them not to fight again." However, their empirical study (2008) on 34 cases of MI agreements since 1945 to 1999 suggests inclusion and implementation of MI agreements does not have a correlation with either short or long-term peace. The study also reveals that, in most cases, MI fails to give security guarantees and it has been used as an economic tool to provide employment to the rebels. Additionally, they also investigate whether MI, when functional with political power-sharing, is instrumental to end a civil war. Their findings show no strong correlation.

Inclusion of power-sharing provisions in the agreements is also considered an effective tool to terminate a civil war. As Fearon and Laitin (2008) argue that, "the aim of parties in a civil war is to gain something. In such a case, power-sharing agreement may act as incentive not to fight." The inclusion of power-sharing may also have a positive or negative impact on democratization as well as on peacebuilding (Jarstad, 2006), or it may

reproduce violent insurgence by encouraging groups to start war with the hope that it will at least earn them power and position in the government,' (Tull & Mehler, 2005).

Though studies (Glassmyer and Sambanis, 2008) suggest no strong correlation between inclusion of power-sharing provisions and termination of civil war, power-sharing in relation to Sierra Leone might have contributed to civil war termination in the country. In Sierra Leone, power-sharing was part of both the Abidjan Peace Agreement in 1996 and the Lome Peace Agreement in 1999. Some argue that having power-sharing provisions in both comprehensive peace agreements had a positive impact on the termination of the Sierra Leone Civil War. On one hand, 'power-sharing provisions had created splinter groups in the RUF leadership regarding whether or not to take advantage of it. These fractions eventually weakened the RUF command structure making it easy for the government to eliminate RUF threat,' (Binningsbo & Dupuy, 2009). On the other hand, the offer of power-sharing might have finally tilted the balance of power in favor of the peace, (TRC report, 2004). However, this claim of power-sharing having influences on the Sierra Leone Civil War termination is refuted by Binningbo and Dupuy in a previous study (2007). Their study claims that, "power sharing did not seem to play a role in the post-conflict settlement. Rather, credible security guarantees from Britain and the UN, together with the arrest of spoilers and reduction of the RUF's income from diamond smuggling ended the Sierra Leonean War".

Besides power-sharing, the role of and inclusion of civil society may influence the peace processes in an armed conflict by acting as ‘third pillar’ with internal government and international communities and contribute to the sustainable peace through their outreach facility to the local population and can foster confidence building, (Lampthey, 2007; Wanis-St. John & Kew, 2008). Therefore, scholars favor the scope of civil society actors in pre and post conflict peace processes.

In the case of Sierra Leone, Ekiyor (2008) and Lampthey (2007) argue that “the Civil Society Movements (CSM) used media to persuade the warring parties to end the war by mobilizing people’s support against war.” The testimony of Fatou Sankoh also suggests that people’s movement against the RUF was indeed a major blow and a deliberate effort to ‘shake the cage’ of Sankoh and his entourage because following these movements, it was easy for the government to blame RUF as the only ‘spoilers of the peace process’. She also cited the prominent role played in the protest by the SLPP Minister of Development, Kadie Sesay, as evidence that the Government used the women’s demonstration to continue the gradual build-up of tensions around the RUF presence in the city, (TRC report, 2004, volume 3A, P.383).

Besides, it is important to take the terms/clauses of an agreement into account. It is important because, parties may resume a war in order to renegotiate the terms should their issues remain unresolved. For example, Werner (1999) investigates combatants’ motives and enforcement to see if the resolution of issues, enforcement, or renegotiating

previous terms have any impact on civil war termination. Her study suggests little support that peace settlements fail to terminate a war because combatants could not resolve the issues in disputes. While Werner's research finds mixed support for the enforcement argument as being the cause of conflict recurrence, she finds strong support for the argument that the combatants restart fighting because of their incentives to renegotiate the terms.

### **Third Party Intervention:**

Following the end of the Cold War, third party intervention in an internal war became a routine job of international and regional communities. For example, military, diplomatic or humanitarian intervention by the UN, the USA, NATO or African Union (AU) in countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America or Balkans. The number of interventions after the Cold War has significantly outnumbered the number of interventions before the Cold War. For example, "the Security Council authorized twenty-seven missions in between 1988 and 1995 compared to thirteen in preceding forty years," (Lipson, 2007). There are apparently two reasons. First, increasing number of civil war outbreak around the world after the Cold War. Second, growing need yet mixed success of intervention in different countries, (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2007). Generally, intervention may be carried out either by big states, international organizations, regional organizations, or a combination of them. Intervention may also take various forms (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, humanitarian, enforcement, observer missions, or a combination of them).

Intervention in Sierra Leone is an example of both multi-party and multi-forms intervention.

The question remains why intervention is needed in an internal war, and how intervention can influence the termination of that war.

Walter (1997) underscores for a third party intervention because she argues that “the warring parties do not enter into negotiated settlement unless a third party steps in with credible security guarantee to enforce and to implement a peace deal. In her study (1997), Walter investigates why a negotiated peace settlement fails and what makes it difficult for parties to reach and implement a peace agreement. Based on the credible commitment and rationalist perspectives of civil war termination, Walter (1997) finds that “in the civil war between 1940 and 1990, combatants almost always failed to reach negotiated settlement unless an outside power guaranteed their safety during the transition period. She also reveals that only mediation efforts are not enough to terminate a civil war. In fact, along with mediation, combatants require credible security guarantees to be convinced to come out of the war.” Her analysis on forty one civil wars during the period also reveals that the security guarantee can ensure short term peace. For long term, however, it needs institutional power-sharing arrangements.

Peceny and Stanley (2001) contend Walter's (1997) idea of guaranteed security from third party enforcers. They argue that "to ensure security by a third party require states to intervene, which most states would lack the incentives to do so unless their security interest is threatened by a civil war in another nation and any promise to intervene will not be credible." Therefore, they suggest the use of liberal social construction policies to terminate a civil war, which is discussed in the next section.

It is true that a state might lack the incentives to intervene in an internal conflict because of the politics of interest. However, it is not always necessary that only states intervene in a civil conflict of another nation as argued by Peceny and Stanley (2001). "The changing nature and the prevalence of civil wars after the Cold War brought out a shift in the response of international conflict resolution system." The international community like the UN, regional economic and military organizations now intervene with diplomatic, military, and economic tools in wartime or post-civil war situations. Have these interventions been successful in terminating the civil war?

In an early study on the effectiveness of the UN in preventing conflict recurrence, Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996) find that the UN has been ineffective in solving conflict in the long-run, it does not have any effect on the occurrence, timing, or severity of future conflict. This has been the first study to examine the long-term effect of UN intervention. However, this study has limitations, as the authors argue, that it is too early to evaluate the long-term effectiveness of UN interventions. As time passed, the UN and

other regional organizations have changed their strategies and enhanced their means and modalities of interventions. The later studies by other academics on third party interventions present different findings.

Fortna (2004) investigates the effectiveness of different types of interventions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and observations missions, by the UN, regional organizations, and ad hoc groups in civil wars after the cold war period. This study finds that international community helps maintain peace and, particularly in the Cold War period, peacekeeping has been an effective tool to avoid a slide back to civil war. Fortna's (2004) findings are consistent with Gilligan and Sergenti (2008). However, there is a significant methodological difference between these studies.

Fortna (2004) selected particularly the post-Cold War cases and categorized them in terms of difficulty level defined as 'where there is no decisive outcome nor the parties are committed to peace rather parties have capacity to disrupt peace process'. Controlling the factors that might influence the degree of difficulty of a particular case, she concludes that 'intervention by the international community in cases where settlement reached helps maintain peace'. On the other, Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) also investigate the post-Cold War intervention cases of the UN, but they categorize them in terms of in-war and post-war intervention settings and they conclude that UN peacekeeping missions have a strong significant effect in lengthening post-war periods of peace but have no significant effect in shortening wars. They argue that the reason why UN does not have any causal effects

on in-war interventions is that the entrance of the UN in such settings shift the balance of military power of the parties, thus prolonging the negotiation. However, they suggest taking the effects of nonrandom assignment of the UN mission into account. Otherwise, they argue, it would lead to an underestimation of the effect of UN interventions in post-war peace settings and overestimate the effect of UN interventions in-war settings.

The importance of considering the nature of UN missions is substantiated by a previous study. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) examine where the United Nations sent missions and where it did not. The study reveals that the number of deaths determines the UN's interventions which, in line with the organization's mission to address costly human sufferings, it has not been evenhanded on how to respond to deaths. This finding also supports Fortna's (2004) proposition that peacekeepers are sent to cases that are most difficult to resolve. Gilligan and Stedman's study reveals that, the UN responds more swiftly when the deaths occur in Europe than in Africa, and acts more swiftly in Africa than in Asia. The study (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003) suggests that the UN is prone to respond to a civil war in a weak state than in a stronger state.

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) also found a significant positive correlation between third party intervention and termination of civil war. Their study suggests that peacemaking aimed at facilitating a peace treaty is highly correlated with an end to the violence. They, however, maintained that only enforcement operations cannot promote durable democratic peace if it does not act in conjunction with the local capacities.

The third party intervention, like the UN and other regional organizations, not only help negotiating a peace deal, bring security guarantees, provide economic aide to reconstruct the post-war country, but also enforce peace settlement and its implementation through the United Nations Chapter VII Provision. These types of military and economic enforcement may change the power parity of the warring parties.

Fearon and Laitin (2008) investigate the significance of these interventions and argue that “civil war tend to end when there is significant shock to the relative power of the combatants or cost tolerance of the one side or the other.” They suggest that the major shock can emerge from the beginning or end of major foreign support to the government or to the rebels. Their argument is based on the notion that the aim of the rebel side in almost all civil wars is to take over the central government or to take political control of a region of the country. Therefore, unlike Walter (1997, 2010) who coded civil war termination based on formal negotiated settlements or a truce, Fearon and Laitin (2008) analyzed the narratives of civil wars based on whether rebels achieved their end of taking control of central government or a particular region that they were fighting for. They constructed narratives of 136 civil war terminations since 1955 and then randomly selected 30 cases of civil war termination which revealed that shock to relative military capacity due to changes in foreign intervention and changes in the leadership in either side commonly cause civil war termination.

However, Werner and Yuen (2005) contend the appropriateness of intervention to terminate a civil war. Unlike the authors who emphasize on enforcement and commitment perspective as being the reasons for war termination, Werner and Yuen (2005) consider barriers to terminate war as a distributional problem. These authors argue that “the agreements that occur under significant third party pressure are prone to failure because the terms of the agreement are often at odds with the military reality on the ground and because considerable uncertainty about the consequences of continued fighting may remain”. They also argue that “agreements that occur when military dominance remains in question are much more vulnerable than those made when military dominance has been decisively demonstrated and there is little room for opposing expectations about the future of continued fighting”. They present a duration analysis of the durability of ceasefire between states after World War II and the analysis provided support for their argument and raises doubt about the relevance of enforcement mechanisms to keep when at least one of the belligerents is determined to return to war.

Both the Werner (1999) and Werner and Yuen (2005) studies were conducted particularly on the interstate conflicts. An interstate war is significantly different from that of intrastate war. Nonetheless, these studies bare significant importance to understand the barriers to terminate a civil war because “civil war states are also embedded in an interstate system,” (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000).

However, there is also a growing debate regarding the motives of third party involvement. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) argue that the intervention of a third party might be 'benevolent; or 'malevolent' in such a way that some may want to end civil war while others may want to prolong it in order to plunder the natural resources.

### **Internal Ecology of the War Locations:**

The internal ecology of the war location is another important determinant of the emergence of and termination of civil war. The internal ecology may be defined in terms of political, social, and economic conditions; demographic composition and geographical or religious factors.

Perhaps, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) conduct the most rigorous study to date on what conditions effectively terminate a civil war. They take war ecology of a particular country into consideration and test a triangular model consisting of international capacities measured in terms of external assistance to design and implement a peace settlement, the degree of hostility in terms of deaths and displacements due to the war, and the level of local capacities measured in terms of GDP per capita or the rate of growth per capita GDP, immediately after the war's end, in order to investigate what kind of war ecology is appropriate to terminate and prevent civil war from recurring. Their study on 124 civil wars up to 1997, following World War II, suggests that terminating a civil war and preventing it from recurring can be successful by promoting democratic

peacebuilding. Democratic peacebuilding, they argue, is successful in a nonidentity war, in low levels of hostilities with high local capacities, and where UN peace operations as well as substantial financial assistance are available. The study reveals that in terms of putting an end to the violence is dependent on muscular third-party intervention and low hostility level.

Peceny and Stanley (2001) investigate the civil war resolution in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Their investigation was to see if the forceful security guarantees out of forceful intervention by external states as well as power-sharing have been instrumental in terminating the civil wars. They conclude that liberal social reconstruction has been effective means of ending civil wars in these countries. The authors argue that the changes in the goals, identities, and institutions of the opposing side wrought by liberal social reconstruction provided sufficient basis for civil war resolution in those three countries. Based on the three cases, these liberalist authors suggest that, third party intervention is unnecessary in a diverse and inclusive society where people are politically and economically interdependent.

Walter (2010) focuses on the relative balances of power of the warring parties as well as the functions of political institutions as key to explain recurrence and termination of civil war. Using the UCDP/PRIO Onset Armed Conflict Data Set, Walter (2010) reveals that equally powerful combatants who are unable to decisively beat each other, or are unable to reach or implement mutually acceptable settlements, make civil conflicts

difficult to terminate and prevent from recurrence. Walter (2010) argues that the ways to permanently end a civil war from recurrence are to militarily defeat one side or building political institutions and credible governments based on rule of law, justice, and equity so that negotiated settlements can be reached and implemented in good faith.

Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2005) and Mason, Gurses, Brandt and Quinn (2011) account for structural conditions of post war environment defined in terms of ‘the extent to which the termination of the original civil war dismantled the conditions of dual sovereignty and the incentives for the former combatants to resume armed conflict rather than accept the status quo.’ Investigating civil wars that began and ended between 1944 and 1997, Quinn et al (2005) finds that civil wars are less likely to recur following rebel victories and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces. Post-war economic development also reduces the probability of civil war recurrence, and the longer the peace can be sustained, the less likely civil war is to recur. These effects hold regardless of whether the previous war was ethnically based or not, and whether it was secessionist or revolutionary. Therefore, Quinn et. al. (2005) conclude that ‘the possibility of terminating a civil war is higher when a peace agreement is mediated, it is enforced by a third party, and finally economic development has been pursued following the war. In addition, Mason et al. (2011) extends the findings and suggests that rebel victories produce more durable peace, provided the new rebel regime can sustain the first few years; government victories produce stable peace for a short time but over a long time it is more fragile.

Government victories can produce stable peace when it can address people's grievances by restoring a decent level of economic well-being.

Walter (2004) investigates the recurrence of civil wars to see if the recurrence has anything to do with the attributes of the previous war. She argues that people join in a civil war when there is severe individual hardships and there are no non-violent means for change. Her analysis of civil wars ending between 1945 and 1996 suggests that recurrence of a civil war is dependent on quality of life and access to political participation. She concluded that, 'countries providing higher levels of economic well-being to their citizenry and create an open political system are less likely to experience multiple civil wars. Walter (2004) also finds that the attributes of a recurring war is not related to the outcome of a previous war. These findings, however, come in contradiction with the findings of Quinn et al (2005) and Mason et al (2011) who argue that the recurrence of civil war is influenced by the outcome of whether the previous war ended in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement.

Moreover, DeRouen Jr and Sobek (2004) consider the role of government on civil war duration and termination. Using Doyle and Sambanis's (2000) civil war data set, DeRouen Jr and Sobek's (2004) study finds that effective state bureaucracy undermines rebel victory; regime type and government army size do not appear as important to rebel victory. Government army size only minimally increases the prospects for a government victory, and state capacity does not appear related to negotiated settlement. The study

also finds that the involvement of the UN significantly increases the likelihood of a truce or treaty, and increases the expected time needed for both government and rebel victories.

The studies on civil war emergence or termination either deal with the contents and processes of agreements, third party intervention, or internal ecology of the war locations. In this study, I focus on the role of interventions in terminating the Sierra Leone civil war. The civil war in Sierra Leone is a particular case to investigate the impacts of intervention because at least five agreements were signed, but four of them were unsuccessful to end the war. At the same time, the intervention has also been intensified over the time and reached its peak by the end of the war in 2002. The intersection of termination of civil war and heightened intervention is a perfect point to investigate whether RUF's compliance to the cease-fire and resulting termination of Sierra Leone Civil War was a consequence of intervention. Moreover, the power-sharing agreement and civil society movement might have had influenced the civil war termination processes which I do not address in this study. However, in this exploratory study I try to explore the reasons why RUF finally agreed to a cease-fire and hence, I focus my attention on whether intervention has anything to do to convince the RUF to comply with the Second Abuja Cease-fire Agreement.

## CHAPTER THREE

### CAUSAL MECHANISM

For the study, I adopt the Civil War Termination Model of Fearon and Laitin (2008). The model suggests that “sudden changes in relative military power of the one side or the other cause civil war termination”.

Fearon and Laitin (2008) argue that “a civil war is driven by intention to take control over central government or part of a country. Therefore, civil war continues until there is viability for any of the party to gain something”. “The viability is defined when their expected benefits are greater than the costs and when their probability of winning all or nothing is greater or equal to the opposing sides.” In such cases, resolving a civil war by compromise or power-sharing is not possible because parties to civil war settlement negotiations know there is a serious risk that agreements will be violated and power-sharing whether over a central or regional government will break down. Further, the parties know that being on the losing side of a breakdown can be extremely risky. Being open can also jeopardizes a rebel group’s leadership. Again, having partially or wholly disarmed or integrated into military force structures can be dangerous for both sides in the event the other cheats. Some of the most harm can come from the winning party should they be motivated to use the state’s coercive powers to eliminate the loser entirely.

The option of coercive elimination is costly because failure to do so would lead to a return to civil war given the rebel group is viable (Fearon and Laitin 2008).

Fearon and Laitin (2008) argue that when power-sharing or compromise fails to terminate a civil war, then it ends as a result of shock to military relative capabilities happening that enables one side to achieve its objectives by force of arms. They further maintain that ‘two relatively observable shocks would be a) the beginning or end of major foreign support for one side or the other and b) a change in the leadership of the government or rebel side during fighting. The first obviously directly influences relative military capabilities and the second might augur a loss of will to fight by one side’. In line with this model, I therefore, hypothesize that-

RH-1: The enhanced external interventions in Sierra Leone caused the termination of the civil war by bringing shock to the relative military capabilities of the RUF, and by weakening their leaderships.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### METHODOLOGY

#### **Process Tracing:**

I used the Process Tracing (PT) method for the study to examine if the causal mechanism exists. PT is a qualitative case study method, which is useful to examine if an event is a cause of a particular outcome in a specific case. In other words, “process tracing is a method to answer question whether X was a cause for Y in case Z,” (Mahoney, 2012).

Bennett (2010) suggests that “researcher employ process-tracing method to study historical cases to understand what events or processes led to an outcome in a historical context.” He further suggests, through PT, researchers may judge ‘competing explanatory claims’ in social science research, make inferences about which alternative explanations are more convincing in what ways, and at what degree. However, researchers use PT to test not only competing hypotheses but also they test individual hypothesis, (Mahoney, 2012). The purpose of using PT is to help establish that-1) An initial event or process took place, 2) A subsequent outcome also occurred, and, 3) The former was the cause of the later, (Mahoney, 2012).

Bennett (2010) argues that PT is advantageous over other statistical methods in testing causal mechanisms of historical events in two ways. First, researchers establish causal direction by carefully tracing processes of who knew what, when, and what they did in response. For example, it might establish whether an arms race caused a war or whether the anticipation of war caused an arms race. Second, the PT method can reduce potential spuriousness. For example, if X and Y are correlated, is this because X caused Y, or is it because some third variable caused both X and Y? Here, PT can help establish whether there is a causal chain of steps connecting X to Y, and whether there is such evidence for other variables that may have caused both X and Y.

Researchers, when using the PT method, can run four empirical tests; the Hoop Test, the Smoking Gun Test, the Straw in the Wind Test, and the Doubly Decisive Test in order to prove a causal mechanism, (Bennett, 2010; Mahoney, 2012; Evera, 1997). For this study I conducted the Doubly Decisive Test, which is a ‘combination of Hoop Test and Smoking Gun Test’ (Evera, 1997) to prove my hypothesis. The Hoop Test proposes that a given piece of evidence, namely a specific Causal Process Observation (CPO), must be present for a hypothesis to be valid, and the Smoking Gun Test proposes that if a given piece of evidence, namely a specific CPO, is present then the hypothesis must be valid proving the causal mechanism, (Mahoney, 2012).

Evera (1997) suggests that to pass a Hoop Test, a hypothesis must jump through the hoop. 'Jumping through the hoop' means that the researcher should reveal the traces of the event he/she is hypothesizing. However, passage of the test gives little support to the theory. To fulfill this vacuum, researchers must run the Smoking Gun Test that makes a causal connection between an incidence and a result. Therefore, a 'Doubly Decisive Test conveys the most information and its passage strongly corroborates the hypothesis,' (Evera, 1997).

To prove the hypothesis of the study, that the external interventions in Sierra Leone caused the termination of the civil war by bringing shock to the relative military capabilities of the RUF and by weakening their leaderships, it is necessary to prove that there has been a presence and enhancement of external interventions. The traces of enhanced external interventions are the CPO. Existence of the CPO passes the Hoop Test. However, only passing the Hoop Test does not prove the causal mechanism. Therefore, a Smoking Gun Test will examine if that Specific CPO convinced RUF to comply with the cease-fire by bringing shock to their military capacities and leadership. Therefore, I hypothesize that...

RH-1): The external interventions in Sierra Leone have been enhanced over time in order to terminate the civil war.

RH-2): The enhanced external interventions in Sierra Leone caused the termination of the civil war by bringing shock to the relative military capabilities of the RUF, and by weakening their leaderships.

### **Case Selection:**

I choose the termination of the civil war in Sierra Leone to study the impact of third party intervention in terminating civil war, and to see what and how the processes of interventions are successful in terminating civil war. This is an ideal case to study about third party intervention and civil war termination because-1) it contained at least five peace agreements, of which four were unsuccessful to end the war; 2) the international and regional actors played diplomatic and military roles that has been intensified at different times; 3) all international actors intervened on behalf of one side, which in turn changed the balance of power system. Therefore, the Sierra Leone Civil War with its peace processes is an ideal case to study what types of intervention work to terminate a civil war.

### **Data Collection:**

I have used secondary sources of data for the study given the limitations from my part to get access to the primary sources. However, I have used two different types of secondary data and content for the two hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, I collected

data from the United Nations Archives (online), its resolutions regarding Sierra Leone, reports from the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, online content and data sources to show the level and intensity of interventions from external actors.

For the second hypothesis, I have used a total of 74 testimonies and statements of the RUF, government soldiers, statements and testimonies of the external and internal stakeholders to see if the external interventions were a cause for which RUF ceased all hostilities. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 2004 and ‘Sierra Leone Web’<sup>13</sup> served as the main sources for data.

Out of more than 1,700 personal and institutional testimonies in the TRC Report, I have purposely selected 59 of the personal and 6 of the institutional testimonies. I have selected testimonies of the people who were actively involved either with the RUF or the government forces, and I have selected the testimonies of the institutions that were actively involved in the peace processes of the war. I have also selected 9 of the RUF statements issued following the signing of the Lome Peace agreement in 1999, up to the date when they finally ceased fire. The intentional selection of these testimonies and the statements allows me to get the most relevant stories of who decided what and why, as well as what made them finally accept the ceasefire. The details of the testimonies and statements are attached to the appendices.

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<sup>13</sup> The Sierra Leone Web is an online archive of the documents on the civil war. It contains the statements of all the stakeholders involved. The archive can be accessed at [www.sierraleoneweb.org](http://www.sierraleoneweb.org).

## **Data Analysis:**

Like data collection procedures, I have employed two different data analysis methods. For the first hypothesis, I have analyzed the contents and the documents and I reported them in the form of narratives. However, I have used both ‘piori’ and ‘open’ coding procedures while analyzing the testimonies and statements. I selected “shock to military capacities” and “shock to leadership” as priori codes to reflect the hypothesis. In addition, I also created “power sharing” and “achieving peace” as open code. Both the priori and the open codes allow me to explore the RUF’s motivations behind the compliance to ceasefire.

The ‘shock to leadership’ again divided into three sub-codes; absence of the chain of command, absence/marginalization of leadership and fractions. The shock to military capacities is divided into five sub-codes-arms and ammunition shortage, cut off financial sources, cut off sources of arms and ammunition, military defeat, and outweighs military skills. The head-code ‘power sharing’ divided into five sub-codes which were amnesty, economic incentives, military incentives, political incentives, and social incentives. However, intention to achieve peace was coded under “to achieve peace” and there was no further sub-code created under this head-code because this intention is itself is self-explanatory. In reporting the results, I made both narratives and quantitative presentations. The definitions of the codes and the coding-guide is attached to the appendices.

While coding the narratives, one of the difficulties I faced was determining the time in which the stories took place. Because, in the eleven years of war, there were many attacks and counter-attacks, as well as many incidences of winning and losing. In order to isolate these stories, I have carefully coded those contents that specifically mentioned their final motivation for ceasefire due to shock to military capacities, shock to leadership, power-sharing, or their intention to achieve peace.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### ANALYSIS

#### **Analysis of the UN, UK and ECOWAS Interventions:**

I present the data analysis in two separate sections. The first section deals with the diplomatic and military interventions of the UN, the UK, and of the ECOWAS. The second section discusses the results if those interventions have any influences on the RUF combatants' motivation to accept the cease-fire and terminate the civil war.

#### **Diplomatic Interventions:**

“The ECOWAS states were the first to engage in Sierra Leone civil war in May 1992 to assist the Sierra Leone government to fight against RUF and to combat NPFL gun running and offensive in the border region,” (Nuamah & Zartman, 2001; Kinsman & Bassuener, 2010). The ECOWAS member states facilitated and hosted all peace talks from 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement to the second Abuja Ceasefire Agreement in 2001, (Kinsman & Bassuener, 2010).

Likewise, the UN has also collaborated with the ECOWAS member states to negotiate a peace settlement in Sierra Leone. For the end, “the Secretary General appointed a special envoy Berhanu Dinka in February 1995 to work with Organization of African Unity and ECOWAS. Along with ECOWAS, Dinka has assisted in negotiating the 1996 Abidjan peace agreement. The agreement derailed by a coup in 1997. In order to restore peace and reinstate civilian government in Sierra Leone, the Secretary General appointed a new special envoy Francis G. Okelo. Okelo worked closely with the ECOWAS committee of five on Sierra Leone to negotiate the Conakry Peace Plan in October 1997. The civilian government restored, yet fighting continued in Sierra Leone. Okelo in consultation with African states facilitated a dialogue among the warring parties. The dialogue resulted in signing of Lome Peace agreement in July 1999 which has fallen apart immediately,” (UN website)<sup>14</sup>.

In addition to facilitating the peace talks, the UN and the ECOWAS also imposed sanctions and embargoes. The ECOWAS states in 1997 first adopted sanction on petroleum products, arms imports, and on travel of the RUF/AFRC leaders, which, after six weeks was followed by another embargo imposed by the UN to prevent RUF and AFRC forces from getting arms and ammunition supplies. The Security Council resolution authorized ECOWAS to ensure strict implementation of the embargoes, (UNSC resolution 1132). In March 1998, the embargo was lifted but again in June 1998,

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<sup>14</sup> The details on the background of the UN’s involvement and its role in Sierra Leone can be found on its website at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html>

the UNSC imposed prohibition on the sale or supply of arms and related materials to non-government forces in Sierra Leone, that excluded ECOMOG and UN troops and the government forces (UNSC resolution 1171).

Holtom (2007) and Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000) argue that “these embargoes were ineffective to stop the conflict because the RUF was getting arms and ammunition in exchange of diamonds through Liberia and Burkina Faso.” The TRC Report (2004) aptly reports the reasons for failure of the peace talks and protraction of the conflict as saying that “it was revealed that the RUF and AFRC are not an ‘indigenous movement’. It is backed and armed by Liberia and its allies Burkina Faso and Libya. These countries have been RUF’s partner in illegal diamond trading on international market. In return, RUF get arms and ammunitions through Liberia, Libya and Burkina Faso borders. The failure of the peace talks is largely because of RUF was in control of diamond mining and using the illegal diamond trade to finance its military campaign through its Charles Taylor and Liberian connection,” (TRC report, Volume 3B, P. 73-76). The diamond production and export data also substantiates this claim.

**Table 1: Diamond production for West African Countries for selected years**  
**Selected years (000 carats)**

|              | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Sierra Leone | 78   | 243  | 347  | 158  | 255  | 213  | 270  | 104  | 8.5  |
| Liberia      | 100  | 100  | 150  | 150  | 100  | 150  | 150  | 150  | 150  |
| Guinea       | 127  | 97   | 153  | 167  | 381  | 365  | 205  | 205  | 205  |
| Ghana        | 650  | 700  | 656  | 591  | 740  | 632  | 715  | 830  | 800  |
| Ivory Coast  | 12   | 15   | 15   | 15   | 84   | 75   | 302  | 307  | 307  |

Source: Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000)

**Table 2: Antwerp imports of West African Diamonds**  
**Selected years (000 carats)**

|              | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995  | 1996  | 1997 | 1998 |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|
| Sierra Leone | 331  | 534  | 831  | 344  | 526  | 455   | 566   | 803  | 770  |
| Liberia      | 5523 | 658  | 1909 | 5006 | 3268 | 10677 | 12320 | 5803 | 2558 |
| Guinea       | 287  | 374  | 526  | 1021 | 875  | 780   | 439   | 533  | 596  |
| Ghana        | 597  | 675  | 689  | 526  | 498  | 643   | 608   | 531  | n.a. |
| Ivory Coast  | 825  | 946  | 868  | 683  | 605  | 1614  | 2214  | 885  | n.a. |

Source: Smillie, Gberie and Hazleton (2000)

The data reveals that the total registered diamond production in Sierra Leone during 1990-1998 is 1753000 carats, while Antwerp imported from Sierra Leone during the same period 5160000 carats. During the same period, the registered diamond production in Liberia stands only at 1200000 carats, while Antwerp imported from Liberia during the same period a total of 47722000 carats. “This indicates that a huge amount of illegal Sierra Leonean diamond has been traded in international market through Liberian connections. However, the data only shows imported Sierra Leone

diamond only to Antwerp. The data for other market like USA, Canada, India remain unknown,” (Smillie, Gberie & Hazleton, 2000).

As the RUF-Liberia-Burkina Faso connections revealed, the UN and international community acted swiftly to cut off these connections. In July 2000, the Security Council again imposed sanctions on the sale of Sierra Leonean diamonds and established a committee to unearth the links between diamond and arms trade (UNSC resolution 1306). Based on the recommendation from the committee established by the Security Council on 30 March 2001 they imposed another arms embargo on Liberia accusing its support for the RUF, (UNSC resolution, 1346). This resolution prohibits all states from selling or supplying Liberia with arms and related material, imposed the ban on the selling or supplying of rough diamonds from or through Liberia, and imposed a travel ban on selected individuals in Liberia. The resolution also orders the Government of Liberia to "immediately cease its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone and for other armed rebel groups in the region,” (UNSC Resolution 1346). Holtom (2007) notes that “the embargo was first of its kind imposed on a state accused of being secondary support to a rebel group.”

This particular action has been very effective in weakening the RUF’s military capacity by cutting off their arms supply line. The statements in the TRC Report suggest that, “RUF lost its military strength due to lack of arms supply as a result of international sanctions and embargo imposed on Liberia, RUF/AFRC”. The report also mentioned that,

“by 2000 RUF did not have enough arms and ammunition to fight back UK, ECOMOG and government troops. They had to use the military equipments seized from the captured UN troops,” (TRC report, Volume 3-B; P. 73-76).

Finally, though the British Government was not directly engaged in diplomatic maneuvers like the UN and ECOWAS, it played an active role in lobbying with the Security Council and other international communities to terminate the armed conflict. The British ambassador at that time in Sierra Leone mentions that, “once it was revealed that Charles Taylor was behind the RUF was using the RUF and exchanged Sierra Leone diamonds for guns with the RUF leadership; the British Government worked hard to get the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Liberia in an attempt to break the Taylor/RUF relationship. The RUF rebellion continued far beyond its natural life because of the support it received from Taylor and his allies,” (TRC Report, 2004 ).

Moreover, “the British government has also provided huge financial support to reestablishing the police forces, creating a politically neutral intelligence service, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program, governance system, social service, judicial system etc.- recognized as essential for the establishment of a durable peace,” (Porter, 2003). The then Labor Government has committed more than £65m since March 1998 to September 2000, including £14m from the Department for International Development, for the government of Sierra Leone's Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme, (BBC News, 10 September 2000). The British

Government, despite the arms embargoes in effect, supplied the Sierra Leone Government with sophisticated arms, ammunitions, and intelligence services through British Mercenary Sandline International with the best knowledge of the British Foreign Office arguing that “the SL government was kept out of the sanctions,” (BBC news, 10 September, 2000).

“The British government also trained Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and seconded a military advisor to the government.” These initiatives have greatly enhanced the strength of the government forces compared to the RUF combatants. In July 2003, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the Royal Commonwealth Society underscored the Britain’s military and logistics supports as saying that “the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) has raised the professional competence of our Armed Forces to a significant level and the Army is now deployed nationwide, especially in areas of the greatest threat to our borders. This is largely the result of the extensive restructuring of the Army and the provision of high quality training for all ranks”.<sup>15</sup>

The diplomatic interventions of the ECOWAS, the UN, and the UK have had significant impacts on the relative strength of the SL Government and the RUF. The following tables show arms transfer to the government, and also military expenditure of the Sierra Leone government that can manifest a partial scenario of the increase in SL

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<sup>15</sup> The full speech of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah at the Royal Commonwealth Society is available at the Sierra Leone Web at [www.sierraleoneweb.org](http://www.sierraleoneweb.org). The Sierra Leone Web is an independent online archive for documents on the country’s civil war.

Government military strength due to aide from external actors while it also presents debilitating strength of the RUF because of the embargoes and cutting off its support lines.

**Table 3: The arms transfer to the RUF before and after the embargoes:**

| Supplier       | Recipient   | Year of deliveries | Comments   |
|----------------|---|--------------------|--|
| Libya          | RUF<br>RUF/AFRC<br>RUF/AFRC<br>RUF/AFRC<br>RUF/AFRC | 1991               | Arms probably sourced from Europe by the NPFL and its backers            |
| Libya          |   | 1996               | USD 500000 worth of arms and ammunition                                  |
| Libya          |   | 1999               | Delivered via Liberia  |
| Slovakia       |   | 1999               | Ammunition delivered to Liberia and shipped to RUF                       |
| Ukraine        |   | 1999               | Brokered by Leonid Minin using a Burkina Faso EUC and transferred to RUF |
| Ukraine        |   | 2000               | Delivered by truck from Liberia  |
| Eastern Europe |   | 1997-2000          | Arms supplied via Burkina Faso, Liberia and Niger                        |

Source: Holtom, (2007); SIPRI arms transfer database

**Table 4: Arms Transfer to the Kabbah government before and after the sanctions:**

| Supplier     | Receiver                   | Year of deliveries | Comments   |
|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------|--|
| China        | Kabbah government          |                    | Smuggled into Sierra Leone by kamajors through Burkina Faso and Mali                 |
| Russia       |                            | 1997               |  |
| Ukraine      |                            | 1997               |  |
| Bulgaria     | Kabbah government in exile | 1998               | Arranged by Sandline International. Delivered to ECOMOG for distribution to kamajors |
| Bulgaria     | Kabbah government          |                    | Bulgarian government loan to buy US \$3.75m worth of arms                            |
| China        |                            | 1999               |  |
| Russia       |                            | 1999               | Lease  |
| South Africa |                            | 1999               | One delivery of military equipment   |
| UK           |                            | 1999               | Total deal est. value GBP 10million. Three deliveries                                |
| UK           |                            | 2000               | Total of 3 deliveries  |

Source: Holtom (2007); SIPRI arms transfer dataset

**Table 5: The military expenditure and arms imports data of Sierra Leone 1991-2002  
Constant US \$ millions base year**

|                      | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 01   | 02   |
|----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Military expenditure | 25.9 | 32.9 | 35.4 | 33.4 | 32.3 | 23.7 | 11.3 | 18.4 | 25.5 | 32.7 | 38.8 | 38.6 |
| Arms imports         | 18   | 1.4  | 1.4  | 4    | 7.6  | 7.6  | 12.6 | 12.6 | 14.8 | 14.8 | 14.8 | 13   |

Source: SIPRI military expenditure database

## **Military Interventions:**

In the same way as the diplomatic interventions, the ECOWAS were the first to intervene militarily, followed by the UN, and lastly the UK in Sierra Leone in May 1992, primarily to assist the SL Government in fighting against the RUF and NPFL gun running and offensive in the border region, (Nuamah & Zartman, 2001; Kinsman & Bassuener 2010). Though ECOWAS is a regional organization of five states, the interventions in Sierra Leone conducted by the ‘essentially Nigerian force’ of the military observer group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS), (Nuamah & Zartman, 2001). The highest deployment reached at 10000 in May 1998 with the largest participation from Nigeria when ECOMOG engaged in direct military confrontation with the AFRC and RUF combatants in order to reinstate a legitimate and democratic government, (Nuamah & Zartman, 2001).

Though the democratic government reinstated, the UN authorized its first deployment of ten military liaisons and security advisory personnel for a period of 90 days to review the military situations of the country and to coordinate between ECOMOG and the SL Government (UNSC Resolution, 1162). As the situation got worse, the Security Council, however, established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), under the protection of ECOMOG, to monitor and advise efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the security forces (UNSC resolution, 1181). The UNSC, in the meantime, has reviewed and extended its initial mandate several times

and the number of military observers increased to 260 before it was terminated (UNSC resolutions, 1220, 1231, 1245 and 1260). However, as provisioned by the Lome Peace Treaty, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a new and much larger mission with a maximum of 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers to assist the government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome Peace Agreement, (UNSC resolution, 1270).

On 7 February 2000, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1289, decided to revise the mandate of UNAMSIL to include a number of additional tasks. It decided to expand the military component to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed. The Council also authorized increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative, and technical components of UNAMSIL, as proposed by the Secretary General, (UNSC Resolution, 1289). The Security Council again increased the authorized strength of UNAMSIL to 13,000 military personnel, including the 260 military observers by the Resolution 1299 of 19 May 2000, (UNSC resolution, 1299). On 30 March 2001, a further increase was authorized to 17,500 military personnel, including the 260 military observers. The Council took this decision by the Resolution 1346, and, by the same resolution, approved a revised concept of operations (UNSC Resolution, 1346).

Even though the UN deployment in Sierra Leone is the highest in its history, the military role of the UN is quite different than those of the ECOMOG and the UK due to their organizational perimeter. For example, the UN was not able to participate in active combat in like manner as the ECOMOG and the UK, though the UN mandated chapter VII intervention.

There are also arguments about the consequences and efficiencies of these interventions. Woods and Reese (2008) argue that the interventions of the ECOMOG and the UN were only partially successful, resulting only in brokered peace and as the RUF was not decisively defeated the country returned back to civil war repeatedly. Moreover, there has been unwarranted delay in the authorization of the UN mission, and in actual deployment. Though the Lome Agreement was signed in July 1999, the Security Council authorized the UN mission in late October 1999, and the UN forces arrived in Sierra Leone in January 2000 (Woods & Reese, 2008).

Furthermore, as Woods and Reese (2008) and Evoe (2008) argue that, “the UN force was ‘ill-equipped’ and ‘insufficient in numbers’ with no chain of command and therefore, were unable to contain the situation and start and monitor the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program as proposed by the Lome agreement because, the RUF was still fighting on the ground, controlling the diamonds fields and there was no sign that RUF would ceasefire and abide by the agreement.” “The gradual pulling out of the ECOMOG troops particularly the Nigerian contingent also created a security

vacuum and very difficult for the UN force to control the situation with inadequate number of troops and with poor logistic supports,” (Woods & Reese, 2008; Evoe, 2008).

However, the situation had completely changed following the abduction of 500 UN troops seizure of their weapons in May 2000, by a fraction of the RUF combatants. This incident was marked as ‘a turning point in Sierra Leone civil war’. Following the incident, the British intervened militarily dispatching 800 paratroops with strong air and naval support, primarily to rescue the UN troops and evacuate the British citizens (Nuamah & Zartman, 2001).

“The British operation was primarily aimed at the rescue of UN personnel and the British citizen from Sierra Leone. However, this operation had both short and long-term impacts on debilitation of the RUF strength. In the short term, the British were able to produce a psychological impact using its rapid reaction force, creating short term tactical advantage and force multipliers while in the long-term, it created the condition so that UN troops can be deployed across the country particularly the diamond fields to facilitate the political process and DDR program of the agreement,” (Evoe, 2008; Woods & Reese, 2008).

Another important dimension in the external military intervention is the Guinean air strike on the RUF bases, particularly in the Meken district, the stronghold of RUF. The TRC Report (2004) states the airstrike as a catalyst, besides UK intervention, in

weakening RUF military power because the British army or the government forces were not deployed in remote mountainous and forest areas of Sierra Leone where RUF's main stronghold and hideouts are established. Guinea started heavy air strikes along its border on the remote RUF bases. The main military capabilities and prowess of the RUF were almost entirely eliminated by a Guinean air strike on RUF bases. The Guinean confrontations were the dying breaths of the RUF as a serious military menace. Following these attacks, the RUF did not have leadership. There was no military ability to continue the war. As a result, they made a genuine effort to accept and comply with the ceasefire, (TRC report, 2004, volume 3-A, p-292; p. 458-465).

As Francis (2009) suggested "the co-deployment of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL, supported by the British military intervention (Operation Palliser), created the enabling environment for the end of the civil war in 2001. The British combat operations, its presence on the ground, its intelligence and other logistic support may have convinced the RUF to ceasefire (TRC report, volume 3-B, p.82) because RUF combatants were completely unable to resist the sheer scale of attacks from the pro-government forces supported by British Military and UNAMSIL.

### **Interventions vs. Compliance to Ceasefire:**

It appears that there has been a gradual increase in the diplomatic and military roles played by the external actors. However, to see whether the causal mechanism was that the RUF finally ceased fire because of the sudden military and leadership shock brought by the diplomatic and military interventions of the external actors, I analyzed 75 sources consisting of RUF statements, testimonies of the combatants, and testimonies of the stakeholders involved.

### **Shock to Leadership:**

Of the 75, seventeen sources (22.66%) said that the RUF was weak and unable to continue war because of the shock to their leadership, which in turn convinced them to lay down their arms. Four of the sources mentioned that there has been no chain of command, while three sources referred to the absence and marginalization of RUF leadership. Further, ten sources reported the presence of factions among RUF leadership following the signing of the Lome Peace Treaty. The sources attributed the absence of chain of command, the absence/marginalization of RUF leadership, and the existence of factions among the RUF top leadership to the dwindling energy of the group, which eventually led them to a cease-fire.

From the analysis of the contents, it reveals that there was an absence of the chain of command and many factions in the RUF top leadership regarding whether they should disarm or continue fighting. Though Foday Sankoh was the leader of the RUF, it appears from the analysis that he did not have any control over Sam Bockharie, alias Mosquita, Issa Sessay, and Moris Kallon, the top three leaders after Foday. One of the RUF's commanding officers mentioned that "when Snakoh orders through Mosquito for us to disarm, Mosquito refused to disarm us. Mosquito said he would not take orders from Sankoh while he was in Freetown and Mosquito asked us to defy Sankoh. Sankoh talked to Mosquito many times from Freetown. Mosquita kept defying him."

It also appears that the absence of the chain of command exacerbated after Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria by the Nigerian government and held in jail for a long time. His being out of command for a long time created a vacuum in the leadership structure of the RUF. For example, an RUF soldier said that while their leader was in prison in Nigeria, they were prepared for disarmament. But the information and communication gap confused the RUF combatants, thus increasing the possibility for manipulation. He said, "Now we had many commanders in the RUF. We had the one that had the power. We, the commanders used to take instructions from the head. In the RUF we had thousands of commanders." The problem of the chain of command was not only a problem in the top leadership, it penetrated the whole top to bottom leadership structure of RUF. For example, one of the lower ranked commanders mentioned that, "when the disarmament process

started, Issa sent a message that we should not disarm in Kailahun. We refused and said since they had disarmed in Makeni, we should disarm here in Kailahun.”

There has been several fractions in the RUF leadership. This is because of their differences in political ideology. As one of the RUF soldiers reveals that “In the RUF we had three groups; NPFL who were Liberians, also we had Sierra Leoneans who were captured and trained here in Sierra Leone and we had Liberians and Sierra Leoneans who were trained in Liberia.” These early fractions have widened in the later part of the movement firstly because of Sankoh’s being in prison for such a long time and secondly, his signing of the Lome Peace Treaty and acceptance of power sharing while most of his commanders were against the peace treaty. This fraction was so acute that there has been a plot to oust Sankoh from RUF leadership. As a member of the RUF top leadership reported, “Our own meeting in Kono preceded the one in Liberia where they decided to change Pa Sankoh as leader of the RUF because they said he was no longer trusted by the people of Sierra Leone and the ECOWAS Heads of State since he was a liar. So they chose Issa as the interim leader.”

### **Shock to Military Capacities:**

Eighteen (24%) sources talked about how the anti-RUF forces brought a sudden military shock to the RUF military capacities. This sudden shock to the military capacities made them believe that they could not win the war anymore. One source cited that there has been shortage of arms and ammunition, two sources pointed out that their sources of finance were cut off, four sources mentioned they did not have enough arms and ammunition because of the cut off of the sources, and finally eight of the sources revealed that military defeat and relatively low military skills were the reasons to convince RUF to comply with the terms of the peace agreement and accept the ceasefire.

The RUF was in extreme shortage of arms and ammunition by the end of the civil war. As one of the RUF members mentioned, “We were however short of ammunition. Our commander at that time asked for more ammunition but there was none. We were asked to go and use the little we had in our guns. Sometimes we had some guns without cartridges.” The shortage in arms and ammunition was a result of cutting off its financial and arms supply line from Liberia. The British Government noted that, “It took us and others in the international community some years to realize that the RUF was not a wholly indigenous movement. It was only in the late 1990s that it was fully realized that Charles Taylor was behind the RUF, was using the RUF, and exchanged Sierra Leone diamonds for guns with the RUF leadership. Once this relationship was fully understood, the British Government worked hard to get the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Liberia in

an attempt to break the Taylor/RUF relationship. The RUF rebellion continued far beyond its natural life because of the support it received from Taylor – and his allies.” Another RUF member also mentioned that, “After a while, the NPFL soldiers were withdrawn and we were under immense pressure and our supply line from Liberia cut off by the ULIMOK. Also our base was coming under heavy attack from ECOMOG, Kamajors, and Sierra Leone Army Forces.”

Another RUF soldier said that, “There was a time at about the time ceasefire was in effect and the RUF boys were running short of money. In order to get money, they will go the UNAMSIL Peace Keepers with their arms on the pretext that they wanted to disarm and in exchange the Peace Keepers will give them money. After a while these boys would return to get back their weapons and the Peace Keepers will disagree. So Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay, were in charge, decided that the only way to bring pressure to bear on these peace keepers was to arrest them. I would say that Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay were responsible. They took them to Kailahun, via Kono.”

It reveals, from the analysis, that military defeat of the RUF was one of the main reasons to decide for peace. The RUF were unable to counter the government forces supported by the British Military. One of the RUF soldiers mentioned that, “My commander was instructed to go to a town called Kasiri to fight. Most of our men died, only few of us returned from that battle. When we returned, our commander instructed us to go and surrender.” The British Government also cited that “The Lome Agreement

provided for a UN Peacekeeping Operation to monitor the peace and provide security. The British Government lobbied hard to get the force up to the size required for the job. But in May 2000 the RUF took UN peacekeepers hostage and threatened to overrun Freetown. The British Government's response was swift and robust. British troops were sent to Sierra Leone to secure the airport and other key points while the Royal Navy sent ships as a backup. This action averted the threat to the democratically-elected government and put the RUF on the back foot.”

### **Power-sharing:**

Of the 75, eight sources (10.66%) mentioned that they opt for ceasefire because of the power sharing agreement. Only one source referred to amnesty, two sources to economic incentives, two sources to political incentives, and three sources referred to social incentives as part of a power sharing agreement for which they would opt for a ceasefire. For example, one of the sources cited that, “the conferred blanket amnesty on the member of AFRC/RUF for all their wrongdoing assisted the implementation of the Lome Peace Agreement”.

Economic incentives as part of power sharing was one of the motivations to accept the cease fire. One source noted that, “Extensive provisions were made for the payment of all sorts of fees and allowances to the rank and file of the RUF in exchange for their participation in the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process.” Another

source who identified economic incentives as their reasons to disarm mentioned that “we enter into DDR program when we learnt that all former SLA are entitled to salary and other benefits while civilians will also be given financial packages”.

One of the RUF statements revealed political incentives as part of a power sharing agreement was its motivation to sign a peace treaty and lay down their arms. It stated that, “In signing the Lome Peace Agreement and requesting for key positions for members of the RUF and myself, I wanted to ensure that the RUF would interact within the system and personally give the people of Sierra Leone peace. This could only be achieved by the RUF being part and parcel of the system and changing the system from within towards successfully democratic elections. The people of Sierra Leone and even Sierra Leone herself has been hurt by negative propoganda and I will not stand by and allow the country to be destroyed again by any force, internal or external.”

However, the RUF’s initial signing of the peace treaty was a deception to take advantage of power sharing, as one of the RUF soldiers notes, “So they said all the G5 should go for disarmament for them to have some benefit. But all this was a sort of trick to increase the number of RUF Party members. We were given some weapons. So we went for disarmament at Njaiama NimiKoro.”

### **To Achieve Peace:**

Of the 75, only five (6.66%) mentioned that they agreed to ceasefire just for the sake of peace. They wanted no more war, no more brutal killings, and they wanted a peaceful Sierra Leone. Therefore, they finally ceased all hostilities and laid down their arms.

One source cited that, “Mr. Sankoh had an audience with all of his top officials. He said we had fought for too long and time to go to the negotiation table. Sankoh said he was conferring with them because he had been invited to a peace talk. He said, ‘One cannot put out a flame of fire with a flame of fire so I want to move from this place’”.

### **Discussion of the Theory and the Data:**

From the analysis above, it appears that there has been degrees of interventions from the external actors at different phases of the Sierra Leone Civil War. Their interventions intensified corresponding to the required situations until the civil war was declared over in 2002. The early military and diplomatic interventions of the ECOWAS member states were supported by the diplomatic interventions of the UN that later changed its mandate from chapter VI to chapter VII, and its troops deployment reached to 17500, the biggest deployment ever in the UN history. The ECOWAS and UN interventions were then supported by the military intervention and logistic support by the

British Government. The interventions at different phases and at different degrees proves the first hypothesis that the external interventions in Sierra Leone have changed and enhanced over time in order to terminate the civil war.


For the second hypothesis, the changed and enhanced nature of external interventions in Sierra Leone caused the termination of the civil war by bringing shock to the relative military capabilities of the RUF and by weakening their leaderships. It appears from the analysis that shock to the military capacities stands as the main reasons (24%) followed by shock to the leadership (22.66%), power sharing (10.66%), and achieving peace (6.66)% as the reasons that the RUF decided to cease fire.

**Table 6: The distribution of codes and coding references**

| Head Code                    | Sub-code                              | Number of coding references | Number of items coded |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Shock to Leadership          |                                       |                             |                       |
|                              | Absence of chain of command           | 6                           | 4                     |
|                              | Absence/marginalization of Leadership | 3                           | 3                     |
|                              | Fractions                             | 15                          | 10                    |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                 |                                       | <b>24</b>                   | <b>17</b>             |
| Shock to Military Capacities |                                       |                             |                       |
|                              | Arms and ammunition Shortage          | 1                           | 1                     |
|                              | Cut of Financial Sources              | 2                           | 2                     |
|                              | Cut of sources of arms and ammunition | 4                           | 4                     |
|                              | Military Defeat                       | 13                          | 8                     |
|                              | Outweighs Military skills             | 4                           | 3                     |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                 |                                       | <b>24</b>                   | <b>18</b>             |

|                  |                      |          |          |
|------------------|----------------------|----------|----------|
| Power sharing    |                      |          |          |
|                  | Amnesty              | 1        | 1        |
|                  | Economic Incentives  | 2        | 2        |
|                  | Military Incentives  | NIL      | NIL      |
|                  | Political Incentives | 2        | 2        |
|                  | Social Incentives    | 3        | 3        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>     |                      | <b>8</b> | <b>8</b> |
| To achieve Peace |                      | 5        | 5        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>     |                      | <b>5</b> | <b>5</b> |

**Table 7: The Percentile Distribution of the Codes**



Though military shock and leadership shock stand out as being the two main factors convincing RUF to decide for cease-fire, the testimonies and the statements do not support that these shocks were the consequences of external interventions. Specifically, the RUF members said that there has been shock to their military capacities and leadership that convinced them to opt for cease-fire, but they did not mention that that

shock was because of external interventions. Therefore, the analysis does not directly support the hypothesis that the changed and enhanced nature of external interventions caused the termination of civil war in Sierra Leone by bringing shock to the relative military capacities of the RUF, and by weakening their leadership.

However, the shock to the leadership, that is the absence of leadership and factions in the group, was the result of the absence of Foday Sankoh from the movement due to his detention for the first time by the Nigerian government and finally by the British Army in 2000 (TRC report, 2004). Although they did not mention their leadership weakened due to external interventions, this weakness happened because of Foday Sankoh's arrest and detention by the external forces. Moreover, shock to military capacities because of the external military and diplomatic interventions was one of the reasons they decided for peace, though they did not directly talk about the external intervention.

Evera (1997) suggests that in political decision-making processes, the policymakers often hide their real intentions by not disclosing why they made certain decision. In such cases, a researcher may reach a conclusion in his/her study based on what actually happened on the ground not based on what policymakers say in public. Therefore, I conclude that the RUF finally complied with the cease-fire and laid down their arms due mainly to the shock to their relative military capacities, and shock to their leadership, brought out by the external diplomatic and military interventions.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

The civil war in Sierra Leone started in 1991 and was declared over in 2002. A number of attempts failed to bring about peace in the country before the parties finally reached an agreement in 2001 and stopped the war. The ECOWAS member states, the UN, and the UK have played a significant role in ending the war. They helped negotiate the peace deals as well as put pressure, through diplomatic and military intervention, on the parties to stop the war. Their diplomatic and military interventions brought about a sudden shock to the relative military and leadership capacities of the RUF. That shock has tilted the balance and convinced RUF to enter into an agreement and stop fighting.

However, this study has a number of limitations in data collection and data analysis processes, which may significantly affect the findings. One of the limitations of the study is the data collection procedures. The data that I used for the study is not to assess the role of external interventions. The testimonies of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were primarily aimed at taking accounts of crimes against humanity and reconcile the perpetrators and the victims through the process of truth telling. Therefore, the testimonies are not mainly related to a discussion about why they ceased fire. The

amount of items (36.02%) that did not match with the coding pattern also reflects this. I believed interviewing the people who were actively engaged in the civil war and peace process would bring out different and more accurate findings in this case.

Another limitation of the study is the coding guide. Though I used Fearon and Laitin's (2008) model of civil war termination, I could not find a specific code book to assess the relationship between civil war termination and external interventions. Therefore, I created a code-book compatible to the data sets. A different coding guide may generate different results of the relationship between external intervention and civil war termination.

Moreover, the findings of this case-specific study are not generalizable to other similar cases and therefore, may not have the similar findings. This is because, the level and intensity of interventions are not the same in every case, regional or international actors are not the same in all cases, the interventions do not have the same effect, and finally, the political reality and geographic dimensions are determinants and different in every case.

The Sierra Leone Civil War is an example of a successful intervention story. Due to the limitation of the data collection and analysis process of the study, it is not fully explored as to how and why the interventions in Sierra Leone became successful. For future study, I will be interested to examine the factors and determinants that parties in a civil war consider in making their choices of ending or continuing a conflict and in relation to that, I will also be interested to examine if third party can influence those factors or determinants in favor of peace.

APPENDIX - A  
LIST OF PERSONAL TESTIMONIES

| SL. NO | NAME                 | GENDER | RUF/AFRC                       | PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES       |
|--------|----------------------|--------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1      | Abdulai Mbawa        | M      | RUF G5 group                   |                             |
| 2      | Abdul Razzak Kamara  | M      | RUF Commander                  |                             |
| 3      | Abdulai Sesay        | M      | RUF Commander                  |                             |
| 4      | Abu Kamara Gbana     | M      | RUF soldier                    |                             |
| 5      | Ahmed Tejan Kabbah   | M      |                                | Sierra Leone President      |
| 6      | Alex Jusu Allieu     | M      | RUF Commander                  |                             |
| 7      | Alex M Jusu          | M      | Abducted by RUF (not soldier)  |                             |
| 8      | Alfred Lamboi Foray  | M      |                                | Paramount Chief             |
| 9      | Alpha Jo Bai         | M      |                                | Kamajor                     |
| 10     | Ansu Koroma          | M      | RUF Commander                  |                             |
| 11     | Anthony Andrew Tollo | M      | RUF soldier                    |                             |
| 12     | Bana Smith           | M      |                                | Kamajor                     |
| 13     | Bobor Jabatie        | M      |                                | Kamajor                     |
| 14     | Borbor Orlando Brown | M      |                                | SLPP                        |
| 15     | Brima Acha Kamara    | M      |                                | Inspector General of Police |
| 16     | Dr. Prince Harding   | M      |                                | SLPP                        |
| 17     | Elizabeth Lavalie    | F      |                                | Parliament member           |
| 18     | Eric Koi Sensei      | M      | Artist later made RUF chairman |                             |
| 19     | Foday Bangura        | M      | RUF abducted child soldier     |                             |
| 20     | Francis B. Tucker    | M      | RUF soldier (abducted)         |                             |
| 21     | Fudie Swarray        | M      | RUF abducted soldier           |                             |

|    |                                       |   |                                 |                                     |
|----|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 22 | Hassan Daco Sallu                     | M |                                 | Kamajor                             |
| 23 | Hassan Ibrahim Kamara                 | M | RUF abducted soldier            |                                     |
| 24 | Hindolo S. Butcher                    | M |                                 | Regional organizing secretary, SLPP |
| 25 | Ibrahim Bangura                       | M |                                 | Member of SLA                       |
| 26 | Ibrahim Brima Kamara                  | M |                                 | CDF                                 |
| 27 | Ibrahim Debe                          | M | RUF commander                   |                                     |
| 28 | James Morseray                        | M | RUF soldier (enforced)          |                                     |
| 29 | Jemba Ngobeh                          | F | RUF commander                   |                                     |
| 30 | Jenneh Beahaie                        | F | Abducted by RUF and bush wife   |                                     |
| 31 | Joe Fatorma                           | M | RUF soldier                     |                                     |
| 32 | John P. Bullie                        | M |                                 | Kamajor                             |
| 33 | Dr Albert Joe Edward Demby            | M |                                 | Vice President of Sierra Leone      |
| 34 | Brigadier Kellie Hassan Conteh (retd) | M |                                 |                                     |
| 35 | Major Gen Tom S. Carew                | M |                                 | Chief of Defense Staff              |
| 36 | Master Bowanag                        | M | RUF soldier (enforced)          |                                     |
| 37 | Master Japo                           | M | RUF commander                   |                                     |
| 38 | Master Patrick Bangura                | M | RUF soldier                     |                                     |
| 39 | Master Rokono                         | M | RUF soldier (abducted)          |                                     |
| 40 | Maya Gaba                             | M | RUF forced worker               |                                     |
| 41 | Mohamed Augustine Brima               | M | RUF security administrator      |                                     |
| 42 | Mohamed Conteh                        | M |                                 | Kamajor                             |
| 43 | Mohamed Kallon                        | M |                                 | Kamajor                             |
| 44 | Mohamed Mansaray                      | M | RUF enforced soldier (abducted) |                                     |

|    |  |   |                                 |                                |
|----|--|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 45 | Mohamed Momoh                          | M | RUF enforced soldier (abducted) |                                |
| 46 | Morie Feika                            | M | RUF commander                   |                                |
| 47 | David L Boulah                         | M | RUF commander                   |                                |
| 48 | Mustapha Bangura                       | M | Member of SLA                   |                                |
| 49 | Mustapha Sam Koroma                    | M | RUF commander                   |                                |
| 50 | Nabie Kamara                           | M | Supplied food to RUF (enforced) |                                |
| 51 | Peter Bagorie                          | M |                                 | Employer at Ministry of health |
| 52 | Retired Captain Moigboi Moigande Kosia | M | RUF commander                   |                                |
| 53 | Sahr Nyakah                            | M |                                 | Kamajor                        |
| 54 | Samuel J                               | M | RUF soldier (enforced)          |                                |
| 55 | Sheku Kpasiwai                         | M |                                 | Kamajor                        |
| 56 | Sheku Mattia                           | M |                                 | Kamajor                        |
| 57 | Susan Kolugbonda                       | F | RUF chairman in Kailahun        |                                |
| 58 | Tamba Ngegba                           | M | RUF assistant (enforced)        |                                |
| 59 | Vandi Brima                            | M |                                 | Member of SLA                  |

APPENDIX - B  
LIST OF INSTITUTIONAL TESTIMONIES

| SL.NO | NAME OF THE INSTITUTION                            |
|-------|--|
| 1     | British Government                                 |
| 2     | Embassy of the United States in Sierra Leone       |
| 3     | National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights |
| 4     | Civil Society Movement Sierra Leone                |
| 5     | National Forum for Human Rights                    |
| 6     | United Nations Development Program                 |

APPENDIX – C  
LIST OF RUF STATEMENTS

| SL. NO | Statement issued to   | Date                           |
|--------|---|--------------------------------|
| 1      | RUF statement to the United Nations special representative on   | 17 <sup>th</sup> August 2001   |
| 2      | Statement of Fatou Sankohon   | 30 May 2000                    |
| 3      | RUF statement to the second meeting of the joint implementation committee of the Lome Peace Agreement | 24 <sup>th</sup> January 2000  |
| 4      | RUF statement to the Sierra Leonean community in the United States                                    | N/A                            |
| 5      | Statement of RUF and AFRC   | 3 October 1999                 |
| 6      | RUF statement at the signing of the Lome Peace agreement  | N/A                            |
| 7      | RUF statement   | 4 <sup>th</sup> September 1999 |
| 8      | RUF statement   | 27 <sup>th</sup> August 2001   |
| 9      | RUF statement to the ECOWAS head of states  | N/A                            |

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